Economic sanctions do not figure very often in talks on what could be done about the situation in Belarus. So, the other day I stirred up a real discussion by presenting this as an option for the European Union. This happened in Tallinn, where I had somewhat unexpectedly found myself in a conference panel along with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe's rapporteur on Belarus, The Economist's Central Europe correspondent, and the vice chairman of the Estonian parliament's foreign affairs committee. None of them seemed to think that my idea was very bright. Frankly, I was not too sure myself either. Conventional wisdom has it that economic sanctions are ineffective or even counter-productive. Besides, they hurt ordinary and innocent people. And still I cannot get this idea off my mind.
-
It has always been said that the EU lacks leverage on Belarus, since there is so little economic exchange between us. But this is no longer true. In the last couple of years, the stream of goods in our direction has quickly multiplied. Over 40 percent of Belarusian exports now go into the EU. To a large extent this seems to be a result of efforts by the country's diplomatic missions abroad. Lukashenko, eager to lessen Russian dominance, has made trade diversification a top priority. He is probably counting on the EU, usually avoiding any hard measures, not to make serious use of its new leverage.
-
I think he is right. But still, the question begs to be asked. Could economic sanctions further a democratic breakthrough in Belarus?
-
The general view at the conference in Tallinn seemed to be that government propaganda would turn sanctions into an advantage for Lukashenko. They would confirm his picture of a Belarus subject to Western aggression, and increase his support among the population. Since the channels for distributing alternative information are so small in Belarus, countering this picture would not be possible.
-
Personally, I am not convinced by this line of reasoning. In terms of public opinion, the Belarusian population is divided into three large segments. One segment really dislikes Lukashenko. Another segment really likes him. Neither of them is likely to change its mind, regardless of whether we sanction Belarus or not. A more interesting question, therefore, is how the third and middle segment would react. These people are usually referred to as "the swamp" in Belarusian political discourse. Their allegiance to ideological values and political forces, including Lukashenko, easily shifts. They do, however, seem to constantly be in favour of their own perceived material interest. (Which of course is quite normal.)
-
Faced with economic sanctions, it is not obvious to me that this segment would put a bold stand against Western aggression above its own material well-being. Actually, even if they would feel that those sanctions were unfair and wrongful, my guess is that they would prefer to get rid of Lukashenko. As everyone knows, next year's presidential election offers the best foreseeable opportunity for this to happen. Consequently, striking Belarus with economic sanctions right now could produce maximum effect at minimum cost. A few months of possible economic ordeal and then, hopefully, an end to neo-totalitarianism in Belarus.
-
The EU does not seem to have considered this, though. Instead, a long process caused by Belarus' repression of labour unions will apparently lead to some sort of economic measures to be implemented next autumn. That is, well after the election.
-
The general view at the conference in Tallinn seemed to be that government propaganda would turn sanctions into an advantage for Lukashenko. They would confirm his picture of a Belarus subject to Western aggression, and increase his support among the population. Since the channels for distributing alternative information are so small in Belarus, countering this picture would not be possible.
-
Personally, I am not convinced by this line of reasoning. In terms of public opinion, the Belarusian population is divided into three large segments. One segment really dislikes Lukashenko. Another segment really likes him. Neither of them is likely to change its mind, regardless of whether we sanction Belarus or not. A more interesting question, therefore, is how the third and middle segment would react. These people are usually referred to as "the swamp" in Belarusian political discourse. Their allegiance to ideological values and political forces, including Lukashenko, easily shifts. They do, however, seem to constantly be in favour of their own perceived material interest. (Which of course is quite normal.)
-
Faced with economic sanctions, it is not obvious to me that this segment would put a bold stand against Western aggression above its own material well-being. Actually, even if they would feel that those sanctions were unfair and wrongful, my guess is that they would prefer to get rid of Lukashenko. As everyone knows, next year's presidential election offers the best foreseeable opportunity for this to happen. Consequently, striking Belarus with economic sanctions right now could produce maximum effect at minimum cost. A few months of possible economic ordeal and then, hopefully, an end to neo-totalitarianism in Belarus.
-
The EU does not seem to have considered this, though. Instead, a long process caused by Belarus' repression of labour unions will apparently lead to some sort of economic measures to be implemented next autumn. That is, well after the election.
-
0 comments:
Post a Comment